

#51-72

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

20 DEC 1972

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00075R000300050051-4


CONF



TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC




Confidential

20 DECEMBER 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 51)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention 1

INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Assail Kissinger Remarks on Talks, U.S. "Duplicity". . . 1
PRG Statement, Comment Score Thieu Proposals for Settlement . . . 3
DRV Foreign Ministry Decries Bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong 5
Moscow Maintains Restraint in Protest Against Bombings. 10
PRC Foreign Ministry Statement Denounces U.S. Raids 13
Le Duc Tho Returns Home; Truong Chinh Goes to Moscow. 16

SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

Suslov Says China Issue Concerns Entire Communist Movement. . . . 19

USSR - JAPAN

Moscow Sees Tanaka Facing Growing Leftist Opposition in Diet. . . 22

CUBA - U.S.

Castro Ties "Dialog" with Washington to End of Blockade 24

CZECHOSLOVAKIA - U.S.

Prague Media Cautiously Register Movement Toward Detente. 26

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Krasnoyarsk Leader Dolgikh Elected Central Committee Secretary. . 29
Ideological Crackdown in Ukraine Gains Momentum 30

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**FBI'S TRENDS****20 DECEMBER 1972**

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 DECEMBER 1972**Moscow (2791 items)**

50th Anniversary of USSR, 30 Dec.	(17%)	24%
Vietnam	(6%)	10%
French CP 20th Congress	(--)	8%
[Suslov Speech	(--)	3%]
China	(4%)	5%
European Security	(3%)	3%

Peking (1388 items)

Domestic Issues	(43%)	42%
Indochina	(23%)	17%
[Vietnam	(17%)	14%]
Guinean Prime Minister in PRC	(4%)	16%
UNGA Session	(15%)	6%
USSR Underground	(--)	2%
Nuclear Tests		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Hanoi has so far issued only a low-keyed response to Kissinger's 16 December press conference on the deadlock in the private Paris talks and to the massive U.S. air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area which began the next day. Initial Vietnamese communist comment on Kissinger's remarks has reported little of their substance while denying that the communist side is delaying a settlement and charging that the United States at the November and December private meetings had demanded modification of basic points in the draft peace accord. Hanoi continues to reaffirm its willingness to sign the agreement without changes, but a VNA commentary on the 19th warned that the U.S. "big-stick and bombing diplomacy" will reduce the prospects for effective negotiations and "gradually eliminate all the favorable conditions for the signing of the agreement."

Hanoi has cited the resumption of U.S. air strikes north of the 20th parallel on 17 December as evidence that Washington intends to try to impose its negotiating terms, and DRV comment has predictably reiterated determination to continue fighting. The heavy air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area--including, according to Hanoi, "deliberate carpet-bombing" of the DRV central radio station--have not so far prompted a government statement, although government or party-government statements have normally responded to such major escalations in the past.

Both Moscow and Peking promptly issued statements charging that the renewed U.S. bombing will further complicate the search for a Vietnam settlement. A temperate TASS statement on the 19th said Moscow is giving "the most serious consideration" to the situation but omitted pledging continuing aid and failed to invoke broader international considerations. A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 20th called the bombing a provocation to the people of the whole world who "eagerly hope" for an early peace in Vietnam. As in other recent pronouncements, the Chinese pledged to continue aiding their Vietnamese allies.

Le Duc Tho returned home from Paris on the 18th after making the customary stopovers in Moscow and Peking. His stay in Peking overlapped with the stopover of a high-level DRV delegation led by Truong Chinh on its way to the USSR's semicentenary celebrations.

DRV, PRG ASSAIL KISSINGER REMARKS ON TALKS, U.S. "DUPLICITY"

Vietnamese communist media have not yet carried any detailed response to Presidential adviser Kissinger's 16 December press conference,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 2 -

although Hanoi and Front propaganda has been routinely denouncing the press conference in commentaries attacking Washington for failing to sign the draft peace agreement. Xuan Thuy's remarks to newsmen in Paris on the 19th, which provide the most concrete DRV answer to Kissinger's press conference statement, were summarized by VNA on the 20th. VNA noted that Xuan Thuy said the DRV side had demanded at the private meetings that the original draft agreement be respected while the U.S. side had offered a total of 126 modifications--the majority of them modifications of a basic nature which "went against the principle of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese population's right to self-determination." Xuan Thuy charged, according to VNA, that the proposed changes "sweep aside the reality of South Vietnam in which there are two armies, two administrations, and three political forces, a reality the American side accepted in October." VNA did not report Xuan Thuy's comments on Hanoi's position on the proposed ICC in which he rejected the U.S. proposal for an ICC composed of several thousand armed men as a scheme to maintain an occupation force and a blatant encroachment on the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

Hanoi's initial reaction to Kissinger's press conference came in a broadcast commentary the following day attributed to VNA. The commentary, which noted that a full text of Kissinger's remarks was not yet available, charged that he had advanced "completely untrue" justifications and denials. While offering no concrete information on the secret talks to refute Kissinger's statement, the broadcast claimed that in talks in November and December "the U.S. side adopted an about-face attitude in delaying the signing of the agreement and demanding reexamination of many basic points." It claimed that "although Mr. Kissinger has repeatedly cast the blame on the DRV side, everyone knows that since the meeting on 20 November the U.S. side has insisted on changing a whole set of points--points which are basic and essential and have the force of principles, not linguistic, technical details, and so forth." According to the commentary, Washington's "about-face attitude in demanding a reexamination of the basic points of the agreement is the only obstacle to the agreement."

Two days after the final session of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks on 13 December, the communist view of the negotiations had been set forth in a PRG statement scoring objections to the draft agreement raised in President Thieu's 12 December National

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 3 -

Assembly speech. An 18 December NHAN DAN Commentator article, offering Hanoi's most authoritative endorsement of the PRG statement to date, took brief note of the Kissinger press conference, claiming that "the Americans' lack of good will was revealed more clearly by the fact that on 16 December Mr. Kissinger disclosed the content of the talks and misinterpreted the status of the discussions." Commentator recalled Kissinger's prediction in his 26 October press conference that only three or four more sessions were required to conclude the agreement, noted that negotiations in Paris have now lasted several weeks, and asserted that "although the contents of the negotiations are not made public, one can be certain that the impasse has been actually caused by the U.S. demand for modification of the fundamental contents of the draft agreement." Another NHAN DAN Commentator article, on the 19th, acknowledged and rejected Kissinger's observation that whenever a settlement was within reach in the talks, it was pulled back.

Initial Liberation Radio comment on the Kissinger press conference came in an 18 December commentary which accused him of "deliberately distorting the truth and reversing right and wrong with a view to shirking U.S. responsibility for sparing no tricks to prolong the negotiations and delay signing the agreement." The commentary echoed Hanoi's charge that Washington has been demanding modification of the fundamental principles of the agreement while intensifying the war and prolonging U.S. involvement. Rejecting any such changes, Liberation Radio declared that the agreement "is our people's minimum demand and is a limit that cannot be surpassed."

PRG STATEMENT, COMMENT SCORE THIEU PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT

The 16 December PRG statement* accused the United States of "creating illusions" about its good will for peace while refusing to "give up its design of aggression" and prolonging the war and U.S. involvement. In a bitter attack on President Thieu's 12 December National Assembly speech, the statement accused Thieu of "publicly rejecting all the basic provisions of the agreement. It claimed that the United States, along with Thieu, wants to make the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops a condition for a peace settlement, is attempting to

* LPA transmitted the PRG statement on the 15th and dated it the 15th, but subsequent comment has referred to it as the statement of the 16th.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

make the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) a territorial boundary, and is opposing the principles of self-determination set forth in the draft peace agreement.

Criticizing each of the alleged allied demands in turn, the PRG statement declared that the call for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops was an "absurd demand which the South Vietnamese people flatly reject." In addition to repeating the implicit communist justification for the presence of northern troops--that the Vietnamese are entitled to fight aggression anywhere in their homeland--the statement noted that the southern army includes "combatants and sons of South Vietnamese people who had regrouped to the North and have returned to fight in their native land." This is the most direct communist acknowledgment that southerners who regrouped in the North under the 1954 Geneva agreements have returned to fight in South Vietnam, although in the early years of the war Hanoi and Front media had publicized regrouped preparations to return and join in the fighting. That theme is not known to have appeared in Hanoi media for more than three years, and Hanoi comment on the PRG statement did not mention its reference to the regrouped. Front comment in the wake of the PRG statement has repeated the statement's assertion about the regrouped.

The PRG statement also rejected the demand for the restoration of the DMZ as a plot to permanently partition Vietnam, and it reiterated the PRG's adherence to a political settlement along the lines set forth in the DRV's nine-point summary of the draft peace accord. It pledged that the PRG "will thoroughly respect and scrupulously implement this agreement once it is signed." If no agreement is reached, the statement vowed, the fighting will continue and "no brutal force, no tricky move of the U.S. imperialists can shake the iron-like determination of the heroic South Vietnamese people."

Hanoi comment on the PRG statement has continued the effort to link Washington with the position taken by Thieu. For example, the 18 December NHAN DAN Commentator article claimed that Thieu's 12 December speech dealt openly with "the same modifications demanded by the Americans." The Commentator article and a 17 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the PRG statement also saw evidence of U.S. backing of the GVN stand in the remark by the U.S. representative at the 170th Paris session on the 14th that Thieu's proposals should get a fair

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 5 -

hearing. In line with this argument, Hanoi and Front media have ignored White House press secretary Ziegler's statement, later on the 14th, that "we have a proposal now being negotiated on a cease-fire, and we support no other position on a cease-fire."

HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRES,
PRISONER EXCHANGE

The PRG statement did not respond to the proposals in President Thieu's 12 December speech for an extended holiday cease-fire with negotiations among the Vietnamese parties and a prisoner exchange. Mme. Binh had denounced Thieu's call for a truce and prisoner exchange in her statement at the 14 December session of the Paris talks, and her comments were reported in full by VNA. Thieu's proposals were discussed in greater detail in the 18 December NHAN DAN Commentator article, which maintained that they would result in renewed fighting after a short truce and the release of U.S. POW's while "tens of thousands of patriotic people" remained in allied prisons. "If there were negotiations," Commentator added, "Thieu would sabotage them immediately by demanding that his insolent demands be implemented." Commentator did note that the PRG will again follow its annual practice of ceasing attacks on the occasion of Christmas and the New Year and other traditional festivals. To date there has been no official PRG announcement of such holiday cease-fires, although such announcements are usually made no later than the first week of December.*

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY DECRIES BOMBING OF HANOI, HAIPHONG

U.S. resumption of bombing above the 20th parallel, beginning with an attack on the Haiphong area on 17 December and highlighted by the attack the next day on Hanoi, drew prompt condemnation from the DRV in a Foreign Ministry statement of the 19th as well as in a number of press and radio commentaries that day. The general theme was set forth in the initial reaction to the attack on Haiphong, in the spokesman's statement of the 18th and in a "special communique" of the DRV War Crimes Commission the same day; both charged that the attack simply constituted further proof of duplicity on the part of the Nixon Administration in asserting that peace was at hand and of its unwillingness to abandon the use of military force to carry out its "aggressive designs" in Vietnam.

* See the TRENDS of 8 December 1971, pages 13-14, for background on holiday cease-fires.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 6 -

Expanding on this theme, the foreign ministry statement said it is "as clear as daylight that each of the new steps taken by the U.S. imperialists to escalate the war is premeditated and planned to prolong and intensify their war of aggression and secure a position of strength in negotiation." Like the last previous foreign ministry statement, issued on 2 December, it linked alleged U.S. war escalation activities--such as the sending of military supplies and "disguised military advisers" to South Vietnam and the escalation of the bombing in both parts of the country--to "dark schemes" of the United States to "prolong and step up the war of aggression" by delaying the signing of the October peace agreement.

In stock terms, the statement declared that efforts by the Nixon Administration to escalate the war will only further expose its deceitful nature while spurring on the "staunch and indomitable" Vietnamese people. The foreign ministry statement closed with the standard demand that the Nixon Administration "stop its war of aggression against Vietnam, give up its policy of 'Vietnamization of the war,' and stop its bombing, mining, blockade and all other acts against the DRV" and with an appeal for support and assistance from "fraternal socialist countries" in pursuing the struggle "in all fields, military, political and diplomatic," until total victory.

Hanoi's initial reaction to the new wave of attacks north of the 20th parallel came in an otherwise routine foreign ministry spokesman's statement of the 18th which condemned strikes of the 17th on Haiphong, air and naval strikes on areas "from Nghe An to Vinh Linh," and continued reconnaissance flights over the North. The first reference to the attacks on Hanoi itself came on 18 December in an ostensibly routine VNA report on plane downings; this early report, saying there had been raids on Hanoi, Haiphong, and four northern provinces, did not mention the use of B-52's. That charge was first made in the 19 December foreign ministry statement, broadcast together with a commentary by Hanoi radio which asserted that the North Vietnamese people--never misled as to the true nature of the "U.S. aggressors"--had been prepared for such an attack and were determined to continue their struggle until the United States accepts the inevitability of its defeat.

The absence to date of a protest at a higher level than the foreign ministry statement seems especially noteworthy in that the massive raids on Hanoi were the first in which B-52's were used

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 7 -

over the capital. Past intensifications of the bombing have triggered higher-level protests. The April bombing expansion, for example, drew a DRV Government statement on 11 April 1972, and the 16 April B-52 strike at Haiphong was protested on the same day in a joint appeal by the DRV Party and Government--a format used previously only in December 1970 following the expanded air attacks against the North and the attempted rescue of U.S. POW's. Similarly, President Nixon's 8 May announcement of the decision to mine DRV rivers and harbors was protested in a government statement of 10 May.

Several Hanoi radio commentaries have stressed that the North Vietnamese people can see through the "double-dealing tactics" of the "U.S. aggressors" and have been prepared to riposte new "war acts" on their part. This is in keeping with the emphasis placed in several recent articles and editorials on the importance of maintaining vigilance and carrying out "passive air defense" activities in areas north of the 20th parallel.

BOMBING OF HANOI RADIO Hanoi has charged the United States with "deliberately carpet-bombing the central radio station of the DRV in an attempt to stifle the voice of justice." The charge, contained in a VNA commentary of the 19th protesting B-52 strikes over Haiphong and Hanoi that day and throughout the previous night, coincided with observed irregularities in Hanoi radio and Liberation Radio broadcasting beginning on the 19th and continuing on the 20th. Judging by the erratic and reduced broadcasting, as well as by audio side effects normally associated with equipment instability, both stations appeared to be operating with reduced power and to be busy juggling available transmitter strength to restore their former broadcast schedules.

Hanoi apparently elected to sustain its domestic/South Vietnam radio service by drawing on transmitters normally used in its various international services, as these are the ones that have deviated most sharply from normal broadcasting patterns. Certain programs in Hanoi's main international service, for example, did not come on the air at all on the 19th and 20th, and those that did--with audio quality varying from fair to very poor--were often in a different language than scheduled. Even the augmented Hanoi domestic/South Vietnam service, however, has continued at this writing to follow a curtailed transmission schedule marked by early sign-offs and no overnight programs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 8 -

OTHER TARGETS Hanoi's comment on the damage caused by the newly expanded U.S. air raids has focused mainly on targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, with more limited comment on attacks on other areas north and south of the 20th parallel.* In Hanoi, areas reported hit on the 18th and 19th include the four suburban districts of Gia Lam, Dong Anh, Tu Liem, and Thanh Tri and the Hai Ba Trung district of the city proper, as well as "many busy downtown streets" and "inhabited quarters inside and outside" the city. B-52 damage in Hanoi has been specifically reported in the Gia Lam, Dong Anh, and Tu Liem suburban districts. Air raid damage in Haiphong was reported in the Lan Chau and Cat Ba island areas, the center of the city, and the An Lao and An Hai suburban districts on the 17th; and to several subsectors of the city itself, the An Thuy, An Lai, and Thuy Nguyen suburban districts, and Kien An city on the 18th-19th. On 20 December, VNA also reported that a Polish cargo ship docked in the port of Haiphong had been hit by "big-sized bombs," resulting in extensive damage to the ship and injured to several crewmen, three of whom died.

PLANE DOWNINGS, POW'S Stressing the fighting spirit and coordination of the "armed forces and people" in the areas involved, Hanoi radio and VNA have reported a total of 13 planes downed "in retaliation" for the night raids of 18 and 19 December. These include, on the night of 18-19 December, two B-52's downed jointly by the armed forces and people of Hanoi and Vinh Phu and two F-4's downed over Hanoi, an F-111 and an A-7 over Haiphong, and a third B-52 over Nghe An; several "aggressor pilots" were reported captured as a result of the downings near Hanoi. In

* These areas include "populated areas from Nghe An to Vinh Linh" on the 17th, according to the spokesman's statement of 18 December. They also include, according to VNA, various localities in the provinces of Quang Ninh, Vinh Phu, Ha Tay, and Hoa Binh on 18 December and Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Ha Tay, and Nam Ha on the 19th.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

action of 19-20 December, two more B-52's were reportedly downed near Hanoi, while Haiphong claimed three F-4's and another A-7 downed, as well as "aggressor pilots" captured.* Other downings over Thanh Hoa earlier in the week combined with those claimed for 18-20 December to bring the DRV's current tally to 4,091; in addition, three ships were said to have been set ablaze off Thanh Hoa.

Six men identified as B-52 pilots, allegedly captured during the action of 18-19 December, were presented to newsmen at a press conference held on the afternoon of the 19th by the Information and Press Office of the DRV Foreign Ministry to "denounce the Nixon clique's frantic war escalation acts." Two of the men, identified as USAF captains Richard Thomas Simpson and Henry Charles Barrows, made brief statements concerning their capture; the latter expressed appreciation for the "marvelous medical treatment" he had received.**

The pilots' remarks were preceded by a statement by the deputy head of the Information and Press Office, who repeated the position taken in the 19 December foreign ministry statement and various commentaries concerning the nature and purpose of the escalation of the air war. Asserting that such acts will only lead the United States to even heavier defeats, the official related this general position to the situation at hand by concluding that "the more the Americans escalate the war the more the namelist of U.S. servicemen killed or captured lengthens." A Hanoi radio broadcast of the 19th claimed that not only were more pilots now being captured, but those who had earlier hoped to go home for Christmas would now be unable to do so.

* To date, U.S. sources have acknowledged the loss of three B-52's, the F-111, and an A-7 in action of the past three days, plus 15 airmen missing. The United States thus lists four B-52's missing as a result of the war in the North; the first such loss was reported on 22 November, a day on which Hanoi claimed to have downed two of the big bombers for an alleged total of 27 since the start of the air war. This week's downings bring Hanoi's figure to 32, of which 24 are claimed for the period since the resumption of the bombing in April.

** The other pilots reported captured, according to VNA on the 19th, are Air Force captains Robert Glenn Certain, Hal K. Wilson, and Charles Arthur Brown, Jr. and Air Force Major Fernando Alexander.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 10 -

MOSCOW MAINTAINS RESTRAINT IN PROTEST AGAINST BOMBINGS

Moscow's continuing caution in its treatment of Vietnam developments was reflected in the 19 December TASS statement protesting the renewed U.S. bombings north of the 20th parallel. Couched in relatively restrained language, the statement failed even to reiterate Soviet pledges of assistance and support for the Vietnamese struggle. The customary greetings message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin on the NFLSV's 20 December anniversary did, however, routinely pledge "all-round assistance and support" to the Vietnamese people's struggle in conformity with "the Leninist principles of internationalism." And Kirilenko and Katushev promised "support" for the Vietnamese struggle when they received Le Duc Tho during his 15-16 December stopover in Moscow on his way home from the Paris talks.

The prompt TASS statement on the bombings was the first on Indochina since a TASS statement of 16 April condemned that day's bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong.* President Nixon's 8 May announcement of the mining of DRV ports had been protested at the higher level of a USSR Government statement on 11 May. The restraint in the newest statement parallels that of the earlier ones, issued at a time when Moscow seemed anxious to balance the dictates of its support for its DRV ally with concern about the atmosphere for President Nixon's impending visit. Thus the 19 December statement did not mention the President or the Administration by name when it scolded the U.S. Air Force for bombing Hanoi and Haiphong, causing civilian casualties and "serious material damage." It did, however, note that a "White House" statement made it clear that the action represents a resumption of wide-scale American air raids throughout the DRV.

TASS asserted that the "new escalation" can only be regarded as an attempt to "pressure" the Vietnamese side and "compel it to accept the American terms for a Vietnam settlement." The statement went on to charge that Washington's decision belies "U.S. leaders'" protestations of a wish to seek mutually accepted solutions to remaining problems, and it added that the actions can only "complicate the situation, prolong the bloodshed, and make it more difficult to reach agreement." The statement concluded on a relatively mild note, expressing the "indignation" of the "Soviet people" and their demand for an immediate halt to the U.S. actions and a speedy signing of the peace agreement.

* The statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 April 1972, pages 10-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

Like the April TASS statement, this is declared that "the governing circles of the Soviet Union are giving the most serious consideration" to the situation. But it differed from the April statement in its failure to pledge continuing aid and support, and it also failed to address the possible effect of the bombings in Indochina on broader international considerations. Both the April TASS statement and the May government statement had warned that American actions could complicate not only the situation in Indochina but the international situation as a whole.

The TASS statement was preceded by several prompt, factual Soviet reports of the bombing raids. TASS on the 18th reported the U.S. raids on Haiphong the previous day; also on the 18th, a TASS correspondent reported that the raid on Hanoi that day took place during a film show on the NFLSV anniversary attended by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Moscow media have replayed subsequent Hanoi reports of bombing raids, mining, and downing of planes, including the DRV Foreign Ministry statement. Moscow has also duly reported statements by U.S. spokesmen, including Secretary Laird's announcement of the lifting of all restrictions on the bombing and a statement by a White House spokesman that the full-scale air war was resumed on the President's orders and was in line with his 8 May speech.

The Soviet leaders' message on the NFLSV anniversary, as summarized by TASS on 20 December, reiterated Soviet support for the DRV demand that the United States speedily sign the peace accord and denounced "attempts by the American side to create various obstacles on the road to a just political settlement." Judging from the summary, the message mentioned neither the suspension of the negotiations nor the resumed U.S. bombing.

Moscow radio reported a brief denunciation of the bombing at a mass meeting held at a Moscow factory to mark the NFLSV's 12th anniversary. Politburo candidate member Ponomarev attended the meeting (Party Secretary Katushev had attended a similar one last year) but was not reported to have spoken. Participants in the meeting adopted a resolution demanding an end to U.S. aggression against Vietnam, an end to "American diplomacy's hypocritical maneuvers at the Paris talks," and signing of the peace agreement. It also expressed support for the "consistent stand" of the PRG and DRV on a just and peaceful settlement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 13 -

PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT DENOUNCES U.S. RAIDS

Peking has promptly weighed in with authoritative support for its Vietnamese allies in the form of a 20 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement condemning the U.S. resumption of bombing north of the 20th parallel and accusing the United States of going back on a commitment to sign the draft accord. Seconding the 19 December DRV protest against the bombing, which was carried in full by NCNA, the Chinese statement marked the first time in over six months that Peking has issued an official statement to support Hanoi's protests of the bombing.* Intervening DRV statements have occasioned no more than editorials or Commentator articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY.

The Chinese statement and accompanying commentary serve to align Peking with its Vietnamese allies on both the military and political fronts. Earlier, on 13 December, Chou En-lai had taken the occasion of a visit by the Guinean prime minister to express concern over the delay in a Vietnam settlement while reiterating Peking's hope for an early signing of the draft agreement. At the same time, Chou pointedly declared that the Chinese "will of course continue to support and assist the armed struggle" of the Vietnamese if the war should be prolonged.

The foreign ministry statement called the U.S. bombing "a most serious step" in prolonging the war, "a new obstacle" to a peace settlement, and a provocation to the people of the world who "eagerly hope for an early realization" of peace in Vietnam. While expressing "utmost indignation," the statement did not cite Chinese interests or broader international considerations. Its only reference to the Nixon Administration was a direct quotation from the DRV statement to the effect that the Administration was vainly attempting to force a settlement on U.S. terms. Concluding by calling on the United States to sign the draft accord "speedily," the Chinese routinely pledged that they will "resolutely perform their internationalist duty and give all-out support and assistance" to the war effort.

* A 12 June PRC Foreign Ministry statement seconding a DRV protest seemed particularly concerned with U.S. raids near the Chinese border. The PRC issued a government statement on 11 May in reaction to the President's 8 May announcement on the mining of DRV ports.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 14 -

VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

The foreign ministry statement, charging that the negotiations have been "dragged out" because the United States sought to make substantive revisions in the draft agreement, stressed that the whole world can now see that it is the United States, and not the Vietnamese communist side, that "has gone back on its commitment" and delayed a settlement. The statement did not go into the details of the negotiations, but Peking has offered its most direct account of the negotiating situation in an accompanying NCNA commentary and an NCNA report of U.S. press comment. The NCNA commentary claimed that in the negotiating sessions beginning on 20 November the United States "threw overboard the agreed principles" of the draft accord and suggested modifications that catered to "the needs of Nguyen Van Thieu." In a notably positive view of the situation at the time of the latest suspension of the Kissinger-Tho talks, NCNA said that "just when the talks were adjourned and about to enter their final stage," the United States resumed the bombing "in a manner of a surprise attack," thus exposing the "inconsistency and perfidy" of the United States in the negotiations.

Asserting that Washington is attempting to threaten and blackmail Hanoi into accepting the U.S. terms, the NCNA commentary said the U.S. Government is once again being "put to the test" and that it will have to make the decision as to whether there will be peace or war. If the decision is for war, NCNA warned, the Chinese will continue to support the Vietnamese struggle.

Peking discreetly resorted to the device of an NCNA account of U.S. press comment to make its first direct reference to Kissinger's 26 October and 16 December press conferences. NCNA cited a New York TIMES article on 17 December drawing a contrast between the two press conferences in order to suggest that the United States, on behalf of Saigon, reopened substantive issues that Kissinger had described as settled in October. NCNA quoted both the TIMES and the Washington STAR as saying the United States is launching a campaign of military and diplomatic pressure to induce Hanoi to accede to a settlement that the President will accept. Quoting the STAR, the account cited Kissinger's 16 December press conference and the resumption of bombing and mining of the DRV as moves in this campaign.

NFLSV ANNIVERSARY

The Chinese leaders' message on the NFLSV's 12th anniversary (20 December) made no direct reference to current Vietnam developments while offering the standard pledge of support and assistance as a "bounden internationalist duty." Reflecting changes over the past year, the message

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 15 -

did not repeat last year's references to people's war and the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina. It added a reference to the PRG as "the genuine legal government" of South Vietnam, presumably a gesture to bolster the PRG's legitimacy. The omission this year of a reference to Laos and Cambodia may be responsive to Sihanouk's insistence that a Vietnam cease-fire will not apply to Cambodia.

The most notable aspect of this year's message was the absence of Mao as one of the signators for the first time in six years. This year's message was signed by PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Premier Chou on behalf of the Chinese government and people. The explanation, which can only be purely speculative at this point, could relate to Mao personally or to some purpose in removing the party dimension from Peking's relations with the NFLSV.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 16 -

LE DUC THO RETURNS HOME; TRUONG CHINH GOES TO MOSCOW

The crisscrossing travels of three North Vietnamese Politburo members--Le Duc Tho returning home from Paris via Moscow and Peking, a delegation headed by Truong Chinh and Hoang Van Hoan stopping over in Peking en route to the USSR's semicentenary celebrations in Moscow--provided opportunities for Hanoi to brief its two big allies and for the latter to put their views on record following the breaking off of the Kissinger-Tho negotiations. Both the Soviets and Chinese used stock terms in expressing support for the Vietnamese communists' struggle and negotiating stand while indicating their hopes for a settlement. Tho left Paris on the 15th, was in Moscow 15-16 December and in Peking the following two days, and returned home on the 18th. Chinh's delegation departed from Hanoi on the 16th and overlapped with Tho's visit in Peking on the 17th and 18th before continuing on to Moscow.

The choice of Chinh, the Hanoi Politburo's second-ranking leader and National Assembly head, to lead the DRV delegation is somewhat surprising considering the rarity of his visits abroad. Party chiefs are representing the other communist countries at the Moscow celebrations, except that the North Koreans, like the North Vietnamese, sent their head of parliament. Le Duan has normally represented the DRV at major Soviet celebrations, including the October Revolution's 50th anniversary in 1967, the Lenin centenary in April 1970, and the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971. Chinh had attended the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 when he was party secretary general. He also attended a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow in February 1960. His most recent previous visit to Moscow was in August 1962 when he and Defense Minister Giap went to the USSR for a "rest," and his most recent previous trip abroad was in January 1971 when he "took a cure" in East Germany.

The inclusion of Hoang Van Hoan in the delegation seems logical enough in view of his longtime involvement in international communist relations. Hoan had been reported present in Peking in mid-November during Tho's stopover en route to Paris, but there were no announcements of Hoan's arrival or departure dates for that visit. In fact, it is not clear from available reports whether or not he remained in China.

MOSCOW Le Duc Tho's 15-16 December stopover was treated in standard fashion, including talks with Politburo member Kirilenko and party secretary Katushev in an atmosphere

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 17 -

characterized by TASS as one of "fraternal friendship and cordiality." TASS reported that the Soviets voiced "invariable and resolute support for the struggle" of the Vietnamese, but there was no direct reference to aid. The Soviet side was also cited by TASS as expressing support for "the good will and constructive approach" taken by the communists at the Paris talks and as calling for the signing of the draft accord, though there was no mention of the suspension of the Kissinger-Tho talks.

The Soviets may have taken an approach too balanced for Hanoi's taste in expressing confidence that unnamed "forces opposing a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict will not be allowed to bring to naught the results achieved" thus far. VNA's report on Tho's stopover--contained, as usual, in a single account of his entire trip between Paris and Hanoi--was identical to the TASS report on the discussions except for omission of that passage.

PEKING For the third time in Tho's eight stopovers this year, Peking publicized the substance of his talk with Chou En-lai. (NCNA had carried excerpts of their remarks during Tho's late-April stopover after the resumption of the formal Paris talks and again in mid-October during Tho's return home after negotiating the draft accord.) According to NCNA, Tho this time gave an account of "the excellent situation" in the Vietnamese struggle and expressed "the iron will" of the Vietnamese to fight for realization of their national aspirations. Chou praised the "victories" won by the Vietnamese and supported their "correct stand" at the Paris talks. He was not quoted as mentioning the suspension of the Kissinger-Tho talks, but he called for a settlement "at an early date" on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's "basic national rights." He added a routine pledge for the Chinese to continue their support so long as the war persists.

On the same day, the 17th, Chou had a separate meeting with the Truong Chinh delegation in what NCNA described in standard fashion as "a very cordial and friendly atmosphere." Neither NCNA nor VNA reported the substance of their discussion, VNA noting merely that there was a "cordial talk" in an atmosphere of "close militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." NCNA's departure announcement said the DRV delegation left for Moscow but did not mention the USSR anniversary as the occasion. Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov was reported by NCNA to have been present at the airport when the delegation arrived in Peking, and the Soviet charge d'affaires was present when it left for Moscow on the 18th (Tolstikov in the meantime presumably having gone to Moscow for the CPSU Central Committee meeting on the 18th).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 18 -

Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao, who reappeared in Peking the previous week after spending several weeks in his Shanghai bailiwick, served as host for both Le Duc Tho and the Chinh delegation. Chang gave a banquet for the Vietnamese on the 17th, but neither NCNA nor VNA went beyond listing those present except to describe an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 19 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

SUSLOV SAYS CHINA ISSUE CONCERNS ENTIRE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Following up Brezhnev's appeal last month for socialist camp unity against the Chinese, Politburo member Suslov declared in his 14 December address to the French CP congress that the "major" differences with "the Maoist leadership" concern the entire international communist movement. As in the case of Brezhnev's gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations in his 30 November speech in Hungary, Suslov's pro forma call for normalization of relations with the PRC was overshadowed by his denunciation of the Chinese for pursuing policies that "play" into the hands of imperialism." Having spoken with satisfaction about the developing detente in Europe, Suslov introduced the China issue by remarking that the successes of the communist movement would have been greater were it not for Peking's obstructionist policies.

BORDER TALKS In keeping with Moscow's practice in recent months, Suslov made no mention of the Sino-Soviet talks, but the thinking on this subject among "well-informed China experts" in Moscow was conveyed by a Hungarian military expert writing in the Budapest weekly *MAGYARORSZAG* (10 December). Istvan Kornendy, who had reported the results of similar discussions in the same journal on 25 July 1971, has now repeated the judgment made at that time to the effect that the Sino-Soviet talks are deadlocked. According to Kornendy's latest account, the unnamed experts explain the impasse as resulting from Peking's persistence in its "unacceptable" demands that the Soviets acknowledge that the existing border treaties are unequal and its claim to "several tens of thousands of square kilometers" of Soviet territory. The Soviets are prepared, according to Kornendy's report, to accept the middle of the main channel (thalweg) of border rivers as the boundary line and to "hand over several dozen islands" now situated on the Chinese side of the line as the result of natural changes in the course of the rivers. This may be a dubious show of generosity when measured against Peking's contention in 1969 that jurisdiction over 600 to 700 islands is in question, but the Soviets thus far have not gone publicly on record as accepting the thalweg principle for demarcating the border.

In his 25 July 1971 article Kornendy cited a Soviet proposal on the renunciation of force which Moscow itself did not officially

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 20 -

disclose until Brezhnev's conciliatory speech this March. Moscow may be awaiting a suitable occasion before announcing its willingness to accept the thalweg principle. Such a declaration would mark a sharp divergence from Moscow's policy statements on the border issue, which have rejected Peking's contention that the boundary along border rivers followed the thalweg and insisted that the boundary ran along the Chinese bank. This interpretation was pressed most recently in a lengthy discussion of the border issue in the June 1972 issue of the Soviet monthly MEZHODUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. However, Moscow has offered to hold consultations to define more precisely the boundary along disputed stretches. According to the Soviet Government statement of 13 June 1969, these adjustments should be made on the basis of "mutual concessions and the economic interests of the local population when delimiting the borderline on stretches which underwent natural changes." Moscow may be loath to go on record in favor of the thalweg principle until it attains the mutual concessions that would permit Soviet retention of certain important islands lying on the Chinese side of the thalweg.

OTHER TOPICS As in his July 1971 article, Kormendy has again portrayed a mood of self-assurance in citing the Soviet experts' assessment of the Chinese nuclear weapons program. The Soviets view the Chinese program "much more as a symbol of Chinese foreign political endeavors than a military instrument" and are not concerned over the possibility of an armed clash because "China's military options will not, in the foreseeable future, reach a level that could jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union."

In their own comment the Soviets have in fact avoided portraying a threat to their security from the Chinese nuclear weapons program, but they have shown some concern over the prospects of an accelerated development by Peking as a result of access to Western technology. Reflecting this concern, a TASS dispatch on 16 December reporting the visit to the United States by a group of Chinese scientists quoted a Chinese atomic energy official as saying American science and technology may be a great help in developing science and technology in China. TASS noted darkly that the PRC voted against the resolution in the UNGA on prohibiting nuclear weapons.

Kormendy's article broached the question of a U.S. role in the development of Chinese military power. He cited the conviction of Soviet observers that since the May summit the United States

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 21 -

regards its relations with the Soviet Union as primary and that it is not in the interests of the United States or Japan to help China become a major economic and military power. One reason, in Kormendy's account, is that this would not be "a safe investment" in view of the "precarious equilibrium" within the top Peking leadership. Bringing his account to an intriguing close, Kormendy said Soviet experts have concluded from an analysis of the Chinese press that a new ideological campaign is about to unfold against the current policy line bearing Chou En-lai's imprint. Apart from a cryptic reference to "the rise" of Yao Wen-yuan, Kormendy did not specify the evidence for this conclusion.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 22 -

USSR - JAPAN

MOSCOW SEES TANAKA FACING GROWING LEFTIST OPPOSITION IN DIET

The Soviet assessment of the results of Japan's 10 December general election reflects the current strains in Moscow's relations with the Tanaka government as well as its apprehension concerning the special relationship emerging between Tokyo and Peking. Soviet commentators have interpreted the election outcome--which resulted in a net loss of 15 seats for the ruling LDP* and a leap from 14 to 38 Diet seats for the JCP as well as notable gains for the JSP, the leading opposition party--as a serious blow to the policies of the Tanaka government and a clear signal of a "swing to the left" in Japanese politics.

Typically, this assessment was pressed most forcefully in an Afonin commentary broadcast by Moscow in Japanese on 11 December, which argued that though the LDP emerged with a majority, the party actually suffered "an appreciable setback" as the so-called Tanaka boom--manufactured by mass media focus on the "Japan-China agreement in order to whip up enthusiasm for Tanaka"--failed to halt the "ebbing popularity" of the Tanaka government. This trend can be documented, Afonin asserted, by the fact that the popularity of Tanaka's opposition is at an all-time high. Sharpening this point, Afonin asserted that the "most meaningful outcome of the election is the great victory of the JCP" and noted that the JCP has become the number two opposition party by more than doubling the number of its representatives in the Diet. This move to the left, Afonin argued, indicates "the need for change in Japan's political life."

Soviet commentators have made a special effort to link LDP losses in the election to Tanaka's pursuit of normalized relations with Peking. A PRAVDA article on 17 December by Viktor Mayevskiy, for example, set forth the case that the LDP's setback was a result of the miscalculations of reactionary forces within Japan which had hoped to exploit Tanaka's moves toward normalization of relations with Peking in hopes of prying concessions from the USSR on the "territorial issue"--the disputed status of the four northern

* Candidates running under the LDP label actually won 271 of the 491 diet seats, 26 less than in the previous Diet, but LDP strength moved to 282 when 11 members elected as independents joined the ruling party after the election.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 23 -

islands acquired by the USSR at the end of World War II. Mayevskiy claimed that the Japanese electorate, by "giving the sack in the recent elections to some of the most zealous supporters of the pro-Peking policy," had unequivocally shown that the plans of those who had hoped to "boost their popularity among the Japanese people" by advocating "stronger relations with the Chinese leadership on an anti-Soviet platform.. are built on sand."

Soviet sensitivity to Peking's attempts to cultivate closer relations with the LDP was reflected in a commentary broadcast by Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin on 16 December which specifically took issue with Peking's carefully contrived account of the outcome of the Japanese election.* The commentary faulted NCNA's report for greeting the LDP's majority uncritically, with "all smiles," and for not pointing out that the election was a "victorious hallmark" for the JCP in capturing "almost three times the number of seats gained in the previous election." The NCNA account was also castigated for "viciously attacking the JCP leadership and flagrantly accusing it of being a revisionist clique." Similarly, TASS on the 16th publicized an AKAHATA article of the same day which criticized NCNA's report on the outcome of the election for "heaping slander and insults" on the JCP and on party chairman Miyamoto. TASS cited AKAHATA's charge that NCNA's report reveals that Peking still "adheres to the positions of great-power interference" and that it "has not abandoned its hostile and disruptive activities and interference in the affairs of the JCP and the democratic movement in Japan."

* Contrasting sharply with Moscow's coverage, Peking's report failed to reflect the LDP's slippage and obscured the JCP gains by providing only the number of total seats won for each party without noting their former strength in the Diet. With typical derision toward the JCP, NCNA failed to note that this party--"under the control of the Miyamoto revisionist clique"--has replaced the Komeito as the second-ranking opposition party. But as if to dwarf the JCP's gain at the polls, NCNA meticulously noted that the LDP's voice in the Diet would actually be larger than the 271 seats won by LDP candidates inasmuch as 11 independents had joined the party after being elected.

- 24 -

CUBA - U. S.

CASTRO TIES "DIALOG" WITH WASHINGTON TO END OF BLOCKADE

Speaking at a mass rally in honor of visiting Chilean President Allende on 13 December, Castro demanded the lifting of the U.S. "blockade" of Cuba as the prerequisite to initiation of any discussion of improving U.S.-Cuban relations. Though couched in harsh, defensive language contrived to convey the impression that Cuba is rigidly opposed to any negotiations with the United States on any issue other than hijacking, Castro's remarks amounted to a softening of Havana's usual expressed conditions for negotiations with Washington, which in the past have also included demands for withdrawal from Guantanamo and an end to "subversive activities" against Cuba. Castro's exclusive focus on the blockade now as the obstacle to a "dialog" with Washington was foreshadowed by remarks he made to journalists in September that put atypical stress on the need for abandonment of the U.S. "blockade policy."*

Castro's discourse on the blockade issue was in the context of comments on aerial hijacking in which he promised to "strive seriously to find a solution to that problem." Asserting that he wanted to dispel illusions that Cuba was interested in "dealings and reconciliations" with the United States, he took note of statements by President Nixon that "U.S. policy toward Cuba 'will not change' and declared defensively: "What do we care about changes . . . and about what Mr. Nixon has in his archreactionary and archfascistic mind?"

Professing simply to reiterate what he had said in his 26 July speech, Castro continued:

. . . as long as the economic blockade of Cuba remains, we will not enter into discussions. Between those who blockade and those blockaded there can exist no dialog. A dialog cannot exist because the dignity and honor of the country that is blockaded so dictate. That is why the first thing they have to do before speaking a single word with us is to cancel the economic blockade unconditionally.

* For a discussion of those remarks, see the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 26-28.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 25 -

Adding that "some have set other conditions" for talks, Castro did not go on to specify any more of his own. In fact, in the 26 July speech, insisting that he "had nothing to discuss" with the United States, he had cited as obstacles all three of the usual ones--lifting of the blockade, an unconditional U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo, and the cessation of "subversive activities" against Cuba. He could not, he said on 26 July, "visualize the improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations."

Castro did restate in the rally speech his 26 July position that if talks were to take place between Washington and Havana, priority consideration would have to be given to Latin American relations with the United States, not to bilateral ties. He expressed hope this time that "when we get ready" to hold talks with "the imperialists" once the blockade is lifted, such talks will be held in conjunction with other "revolutionary" governments, on the grounds that Cuba's problems are the same as those of Chile, Peru, Panama, and the peoples of Latin America as a whole.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 26 -

CZECHOSLOVAKIA - U. S.

PRAGUE MEDIA CAUTIOUSLY REGISTER MOVEMENT TOWARD DETENTE

Prague media have apprised the Czechoslovak people cautiously, in low key, and with little detail of the new movement toward improved relations with the United States. Premier Strougal's remarks on Prague-Washington relations to Washington POST correspondent John Goshko have been acknowledged in short reports of the 16 December POST article in which they appeared, and a report by the Washington correspondent of the party daily RUDE PRAVO used the POST series on the subject to document indications of a mutual effort to ease relations. In statements for home consumption carried directly in Czechoslovak media, government and party leaders have broached the idea of improved relations very briefly and with careful qualifiers, including an emphatic assertion of the primacy of the alliance with the Soviet Union.

POST ARTICLES On 13 December the Prague domestic radio said "RUDE PRAVO's correspondent in Washington has written that the United States and Czechoslovakia are making endeavors for a speedy improvement of mutual relations and that talks will start soon on a consular agreement, scientific and cultural exchanges, and financial questions." Noting that a frontpage picture of First Secretary Husak had accompanied a POST article on Prague-Washington relations on the 12th and that "the first step" in the bilateral detente process had been a talk between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Chnoupek at the United Nations, the Prague report added that this Post article "says this development was due to an American decision which, allegedly, is the latest step in President Nixon's policy of easing tensions in Europe."

Goshko's account of his interview with Strougal was reported promptly in a brief Prague domestic radio news item on the 16th. The broadcast said "the Washington POST today published an interview by its correspondent John Goshko with Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal," adding no detail beyond the fact that "the interview was primarily concerned with the expansion of Czechoslovak-American relations and their further development and with the conference on European security and cooperation."

Bratislava PRAVDA on the 18th printed only the brief report carried by the radio, but RUDE PRAVO of the 18th added a few more details. It noted that a picture of Strougal accompanied the Goshko article and recalled that this was the second appearance of a Czechoslovak leader's picture in the paper "in a short period." It also alluded

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 27 -

twice to Strougal's remarks on the indispensability of most-favored-nation treatment for Czechoslovakia; reporting that the interview brought out the fact that "American official policy does not grant the CSSR the most-favored-nation clause," RUDE PRAVO quoted the premier as saying that "without eliminating discrimination on the part of the United States, a good development of trade relations will not be possible." In the same vein, CTK on 1 December had reported Czechoslovak commercial counselor Novacek as having stated in New York that "renewal of the most-favored-nation clause for Czechoslovakia" was the chief controlling factor in a possible increase in bilateral trade relations.

Prague media have also publicized the visit of a group of U.S. Senators to Czechoslovakia as a move in the direction of improving relations. The RUDE PRAVO correspondent's report of the 12 December POST article noted that it "favorably assesses the highest-level reception" given the Senators. Their meeting with Husak and President Svoboda had been publicized by CTK on 1 December and in RUDE PRAVO the next day. CTK reported that "the present state of relations" between the two countries "was reviewed during the discussion" and that "the Czechoslovak representatives pointed out a number of obstacles" to the development of mutual relations, the removal of which would facilitate their improvement. It added that "both sides expressed the wish to seek ways of promoting relations, particularly in the economic field and in other spheres, in harmony with the positive trends currently gaining in strength in international relations." CTK mentioned that the meeting was attended by CPCZ Presidium member and secretary Bilak, Foreign Minister Chnoupek, and U.S. Ambassador Sherer.

LEADERS' STATEMENTS Top Czechoslovak leaders have made passing reference to a desire for improved relations with Washington as part of the developing general trend of detente. An article by Chnoupek in the 12 December Bratislava PRAVDA, after reiterating calls for improved relations with West Germany, added that Czechoslovakia wants to develop broad cooperation with the other West European countries "and with the United States--naturally, on the principle of equal with equal." In keeping with the dominant theme of the article, "proletarian internationalism," Chnoupek added that such a policy of improved relations with the West was possible only because of the CSSR's membership in the socialist community and because "our alliance with the Soviet Union in the first place guarantees our security and is a reliable support for our position in the world." This caveat was printed in boldface type.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 28 -

CPCZ First Secretary Husak, in an 18 December speech at a Prague meeting commemorating the USSR's 50th anniversary, referred obliquely to the question of improved relations with the United States in noting that, in supporting the USSR's peace initiatives, "we ourselves strive for the removal of obstacles" impeding the development of "normal" cooperation with "all" countries.

BACKGROUND As the post-1968 "consolidation" process has developed, Prague media's treatment of the United States has been increasingly attuned to Moscow's, echoing the themes of Soviet comment and also serving as Moscow's most articulate orthodox mouthpiece. Thus during President Nixon's visit to the PRC, Prague led the other East European countries in the volume and intensity of comment characterizing the visit as an anti-Soviet plot, a charge either avoided in Moscow's own restrained commentary or attributed to foreign media. On the occasion of President Nixon's visit to the USSR, Prague media focused on U.S. policy on Vietnam at the start of the visit, then switched over to effusive comment on the successful results of the negotiations. In contrast, Hungary and East Germany sustained their attacks on the United States on the Vietnam issue throughout the visit and were relatively restrained on the results of the talks.

More recently, Czechoslovak comment on the Vietnam negotiations has gone beyond Moscow's in criticizing President Nixon directly for the absence of a settlement. A typical commentary in the Bratislava domestic service on 17 December charged that "what Nixon can afford and what he has been deliberately doing for two months is to postpone peace in Vietnam" in the hope of achieving a more favorable settlement through stepped-up military pressure.

In the sphere of European affairs, Czechoslovak comment on the Helsinki talks in preparation for a European security conference has directed veiled criticism at the U.S. position, while leveling explicit criticism only at "NATO."

On the score of bilateral relations, Prague media under Husak have avoided two themes aired during the Dubcek era--acknowledgment of a U.S. role in the liberation of Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II and calls for the return of Czechoslovak gold taken by the Germans during World War II and now in U.S. custody. Strougal, in his remarks to Goshko, acknowledged for American consumption the U.S. role in the liberation, but Prague media's accounts of the interview omitted his remarks on the subject. The current demand for most-favored-nation status in return for the CSSR's payment of U.S. claims against it in effect displaces the earlier demands for return of the gold. RUDE PRAVO, in reporting Strougal's remarks on the need for most-favored-nation treatment, did not mention his reference to the U.S. claims against Czechoslovakia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 29 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

KRASNOYARSK LEADER DOLGIKH ELECTED CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY

In the first addition to the 25-man leadership in more than four years, the 18 December Central Committee plenum elected Krasnoyarsk Kray First Secretary V. I. Dolgikh to the post of Central Committee secretary. The 48-year old Dolgikh apparently will take over responsibility for heavy industry, succeeding M. S. Solomentsev, who became RSFSR premier a year and a half ago. Dolgikh, though lacking career ties with Brezhnev, appears to owe his promotion to Brezhnev's enthusiasm over a regional development plan he submitted to Moscow for approval.

Dolgikh, with no experience in party work, was promoted from director of the Norilsk mining combine to first secretary of sprawling Krasnoyarsk kray in April 1969. In that capacity he prepared a 10-year plan for coordinated development of the kray and submitted it to Moscow. As he explained in a 21 May SOVIET RUSSIA interview, the plan received "the most active support in the Central Committee, which . . . adopted a special decree providing for long term planning" in the kray, and "Leonid Ilich Brezhnev gave a high evaluation" of the plan. In his 11 June 1971 election speech Brezhnev praised the Krasnoyarsk plan "as an example" for Siberian development and cited the "recently adopted decision" of the Central Committee.

Since the regime is investing huge sums in Krasnoyarsk--the kray occupies third place in the RSFSR in the volume of investments--it obviously valued the managerial skills displayed by Dolgikh. Dolgikh's success in overfulfilling construction plans is particularly noteworthy in view of Premier Kosygin's recent critical statements about the chronic dispersal of construction funds and the continuing failure to complete construction projects. Dolgikh may also have gained favor by his extensive praise of Brezhnev's 24th CPSU Congress report in his congress speech and by accompanying Brezhnev on a December 1971 trip to Poland. During his August visit to the virgin lands Brezhnev spent three days in Krasnoyarsk, delivering a speech and consulting with Dolgikh and other local leaders.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

20 DECEMBER 1972

- 30 -

IDEOLOGICAL CRACKDOWN IN UKRAINE GAINS MOMENTUM

Signs of a developing crackdown have appeared in the Ukraine following the 10 October appointment of hardliner V. Yu. Malanchuk as Ukrainian Central Committee secretary for ideology in place of the moderate F. D. Ovcharenko.* A purge of the Ukrainian Central Committee section for science and educational institutions has begun with the appointment of two new officials and the removal of one of Ovcharenko's proteges. At the same time, Ukrainian historians and novelists have come under attack for implicitly anti-Russian interpretations of Ukrainian history--interpretations that were condoned and at times even encouraged during Shelest's tenure as Ukrainian first secretary. The attacks have focused on the historical role of the Zaporozhe Cossacks, who have served traditionally both as a source of Ukrainian national pride and as a catalyst of anti-Russian sentiment.

CHANGE IN POLICY The hardening of official attitudes toward Ukrainian writers and historians was clearly evident in the aftermath of Shelest's ouster. Shelest's successor, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, complained in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 28 July of "liberalism in evaluating the creative work of some writers and artists" and stressed the need for closer Russian-Ukrainian ties and for combatting Ukrainian nationalism. New Ukrainian President I. S. Grushetskiy, writing in IZVESTIYA on 9 December, likewise attacked "attempts of certain immature writers and researchers to idealize the past and evaluate the historical path of the peoples of the USSR from non-class positions."

The Malanchuk appointment has been followed by a shakeup in the Ukrainian ideological apparatus. I. I. Tyvetkov, named head of the Central Committee section for science and educational institutions in 1968 after Ovcharenko became secretary for ideology, has apparently been replaced; he was last identified in that post on 21 November, but his name was missing from the list of signatories to the 8 December obituary of former Ukrainian Academy of Sciences President A. V. Palladin. His successor apparently is F. M. Rudich, who was listed as head of an unidentified section on 7 December and who signed the Palladin obituary. As Kiev oikom secretary for ideology since June 1968, Rudich has dealt with Kiev's universities and intellectuals, and at a republic-wide conference of scholars in late October, reported in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 26 October, he delivered the main report calling for intensified indoctrination of scientific cadres.

* For background see the TRENDS of 18 October, pages 21-23.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 31 -

A new deputy head of the science and educational institutions section, Ye. O. Litvinenko, was also identified on 7 December, suggesting that a purge of Ovcharenko's appointees is now in process.

INTENSIFIED ATTACKS The changes in the Ukrainian ideological apparatus have been accompanied by mounting criticism of writers and historians for idealizing the Ukrainian past at the expense of Russian interests. A historical novel by Ivan Bilik was criticized in a review by P. Tolochko in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 17 November for alleging that Ukrainian civilization long predated that of Russia and that the Ukrainian Cossacks originated in Germany in the fourth or fifth century. Bilik's novel was also assailed for serious ideological errors by hardliner Yuriy Zbanatskiy at a late-October Kiev writers union meeting reported in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 20 October.

In the November 1972 QUESTIONS OF HISTORY Russian historian Ye. I. Druzhinina assailed Ukrainian historian N. P. Kitsenko's 1972 history of the Zaporozhe Cossack community for misinterpreting tsarist policy toward the Cossacks and for ignoring the class struggle within the Cossack community. Druzhinina charged that the history lacks the "spirit of brotherhood and friendship" between peoples and that "Ukrainian historians" had not pointed out Kitsenko's errors. Kitsenko's history was criticized for depicting as heroes Cossack leaders who burned Russian towns and mistreated Russians and who tried to return the Ukraine to Swedish and Polish domination; for stressing the Cossacks' struggle against foreign enemies instead of their internal class divisions; for viewing the Cossacks, in the manner of prerevolutionary bourgeois historians, as a society of equals; for claiming that the Russians had enserfed the Zaporozhe peasants after destroying their community in 1775 instead of showing the beneficial effects of tsarist rule on the Cossacks; for viewing the settlement of other nationalities in the Ukraine only from a negative standpoint; and even for praising the Ukrainian pogroms against foreign colonists.

In her attack on Kitsenko's history, Druzhinina assailed the author for attributing the phrase "Christian Cossack republic" to Marx-- a formulation that has proved embarrassing to Russians but pleasing to Ukrainians, who quote it frequently. Druzhinina claimed that a close reading of Marx's writings suggested that he may not have used the phrase seriously and that, besides, Marx's understanding of the Cossacks was limited by the source material available to him at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 32 -

Ironically, Kitsenko, far from being an obscure historian, was a longtime ideological official in Zaporozhe oblast. He was chief editor of the oblast radio until 1962 and later became head of the oblast Agitprop section. He was obkom ideology secretary in 1963-65 and then became oblast deputy executive committee chairman.

NATIONAL SYMBOL The uproar over Kitsenko's idealization of the Ukrainian past is particularly noteworthy because the Zaporozhe Cossack community has long been a focus of Ukrainian pride and a symbol of conflict over Soviet nationalities policy. The Ukrainian novelist Oles Honchar brought the conflict into the open with his controversial 1968 novel "The Cathedral," which defended the Ukrainian tradition embodied in the Zaporozhe community against contemporary Russian influences. The cathedral in Honchar's novel was built by the Zaporozhe Cossacks after the Russian conquest as a symbol of their "unconquerability" and "spirit of freedom." Attacking the contemporary Russian or russified party and industrial bosses, Honchar's hero spoke of "the spirit of the Cossack republic trampled by ignoramuses and vulgarizers who even have forgotten Marx's evaluation" of the Zaporozhe community.

The role of the Zaporozhe Cossacks in the Ukrainian cultural heritage was promoted especially by former Ukrainian party chief Shelest. Lauding the Zaporozhe Cossacks in his 1970 book "Our Soviet Ukraine," Shelest, like Kitsenko and Honchar, proudly flaunted Marx's statement, asserting that the "democratic system of the community gave Karl Marx reason to call it a 'Christian Cossack republic'" and that "Marx stressed that the Cossack spirit spread over all the Ukraine." Shelest complained that "unfortunately, our present-day historical and artistic literature, cinema, and depictive art still insufficiently portray the progressive role and significance of the Zaporozhe community and this glorious page in the heroic chronicle of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people." Speaking in the same vein at the Ukrainian writers congress in 1971, Honchar likewise complained that the Zaporozhe "Cossack republic" was not being given enough attention in films, and he urged that the "patriotic feats of the Ukrainian Cossacks" be portrayed in such a way as to inspire Ukrainian youth.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
20 DECEMBER 1972

- 33 -

MALANCHUK'S REACTION Shelest's idealization of the Ukrainian past and his moderate national policy drew a response from his pro-Russian critics in the form of a lengthy historical treatise by Malanchuk in the March issue of the Lvov journal ZHOVTEN. Malanchuk's treatise, without mentioning Shelest, countered the highly favorable image of the Zaporozhe community presented in Shelest's book. Where Shelest had written that "tsarism was especially alarmed by the Zaporozhe community's autonomous status" and by its "struggle against social and national oppression," Malanchuk attacked "foreign historians" for asserting that Russia had destroyed the Zaporozh Cossack community because it was a "hotbed of the liberation movement and independent ideas."

Where Shelest wrote that "the Ukrainian people cursed the tsaritsa [Catherine] and the landowners" and that the Russian ruler had brought in German colonists and "extended serfdom to the Ukrainian peasantry," Malanchuk again criticized "foreign historians" for asserting that serfdom had been introduced in the Ukraine by Catherine, claiming instead that Catherine's ukase simply legalized an already existing situation.

CONFIDENTIAL